Saturday, November 15, 2008
It's a Small World After All
Only later did I find out that crowds of people around the world were doing exactly the same thing at exactly the same moment. It was yet another example of how much we are all interconnected these days - in our awareness of what’s going on and in our awareness that events on the other side of the world can affect our lives.
While young people today may think nothing of this state of affairs, it’s something I still view with a degree of amazement. I was 11 years old and living in Panama when President Kennedy was assassinated. Communications-wise, it was a very different era. While people in the US watched on TV events like Oswald’s arrest and subsequent murder, the American (Canal Zone) TV station just provided a static graphic with Kennedy’s name and dates of birth and death - a sort of video gravestone. The audio consisted of radio transmissions and reports; I didn’t see Oswald get shot, I heard it reported - kind of like play-by-play coverage of a baseball game.
For better or worse, with today’s technology we are now much more tightly linked together. As Archbishop Desmond Tutu wrote, “...we are all caught up in a delicate network of interdependence, unable to celebrate fully our own heritage and place in the world, unable to realize our full potential as human beings, unless everyone else, everywhere else, can do the same.”
This is something we are still trying to understand and come to terms with. If the world is a network of links, how do we deal with it? The traditional way of dealing with things draws from a mechanical perspective of command and control that is pyramidal in form, with many down below and very few on top. In such a world, those with the most power control what happens. They are “the deciders.” But in a linked world, power is not pyramidal; it is networked, with everyone on basically the same plane. Clearly, this means the rules have changed. (An example of this change for military strategy is presented in the article “Command and (Out of) Control.”)
So what are the rules for a networked world? A useful resource for this is Albert-Laszlo Barabasi’s book “Linked - How Everything Is Connected to Everything Else and What It Means For Business, Science and Everyday Life.” One of his main points is that, while all nodes in a network may be equal in some respects, they are not equal in one key way. The difference between nodes is a question of how many links there are to a particular node. While there are many websites on the Internet, some receive a LOT more traffic and links than others. These popular nodes, which Barabasi calls hubs, are the power centers in any kind of network.
A key difference between traditional power centers and network hubs is defined by the source of their power. Traditional power comes from the hoarding of resources like money, weapons and control. Once one has the power, he or she can then dictate behavior to others. However, network power is more democratic: a hub gains or loses power based on the willingness of others to link to it. If something new and better comes along, a hub is likely to lose both links and influence. An example of this can be found with internet search engines: at one point AltaVista was one of the top search engines around; now Google rules the roost and AltaVista struggles to keep up.
In the traditional world, influence is something to be wielded: if you have enough power, you can influence the behavior of those you deal with. In a networked world, influence is something to be cultivated: the more connections you establish with others, the more influence you have. A great example of this from the music world is provided by songwriter Darrell Brown in “The Get-Out-the-Song Effort.”
Some may have wondered why so many people around the world were so excited by the election of Barrack Obama. Surely, there are many contributing factors. But one of those factors may relate to the perception of how Obama will use power compared to his predecessor.
The Bush-Cheney administration had a very traditional view of power: they felt America had the biggest military and economy in the world, so they could tell everyone else what to do. Judging by Obama’s campaign, it appears he has a better understanding of power from a network perspective. If he deals with the world and its problems from that perspective, America’s policies are likely to be very different.
At least, that’s the hope!
Saturday, November 1, 2008
On Trees and Forests
Does that make me smarter than all the experts who claimed that everything was hunky dory over the past few years? Hardly. But it might mean that, unburdened by any expertise about lots of financial minutia, I was free to get a clearer sense of the big picture.
I didn’t know a lot of the fine points, but it seemed clear to me that much of what had been going on in the economy - all the spending, borrowing and general high living - was not sustainable. Possibly channeling Paul Krugman, I felt we’d been living lately in a “Wile E. Coyote economy”: we’d gone off a cliff and were suspended in mid-air, awaiting the moment of awareness that would send us plummeting down. From this perspective, it wasn’t a question of if things were going to crash, but when.
So why were the experts like Alan Greenspan so shocked by what happened?
At least a part of the problem might be that experts all to often fall into the habit of breaking complex systems down into smaller and smaller pieces, and then just focusing on some of those pieces. Some people may focus on the housing market, for example, while others may focus on how financial institutions evaluate their risk. But apparently few experts were looking at the financial system as a whole, including all the ways facets like the housing market and institutions’ risk management might relate. (This is an issue I touched on here.)
In cases like this, non-experts - not being focused on one particular facet or another - might be able to sense the big picture better than the experts. As the saying goes, the experts can’t see the forest for the trees. As with the wave/particle duality in physics, it sometimes requires a change in perspective for us to see two distinct but equally true facets of something - whether it is an electron or an economy.
A great example of experts being blinded by their expertise is offered in the movie “My Dinner With Andre,” when Andre Gregory talks about his experience in a hospital:
“You know, we'd gone to the hospital to see my mother, and I went in to see her. And I saw this woman who looked as bad as any survivor of Auschwitz or Dachau. And I was out in the hall, sort of comforting my father, when a doctor who is a specialist in a problem that she had with her arm, went into her room and came out just beaming. And he said: 'Boy! Don't we have a lot of reason to feel great! Isn't it wonderful how she's coming along!' Now, all he saw was the arm, that's all he saw.”
If experts want to avoid finding themselves “in a state of shocked disbelief” they are going to have to learn to view complex phenomena as a system, not as just an amalgam of a bunch of pieces. They will have to learn to see the forest as well as the trees.
Saturday, October 25, 2008
Chaos On Wall Street
Friday, October 10, 2008
Reality Isn’t What It Used To Be
Reality is that which, when you stop believing in it, doesn't go away. ~Philip K. Dick
The world would probably be a lot better off if people weren't so smug about their sense of reality. Regardless of nationality, religion or political affiliation, we have a tendency to believe we have a firm grip on The Way Things Are, and a confidence that our actions and beliefs are clearly the best way to deal with life's issues both large and small.
The fact that many things in life today, including many things other people do, appear nonsensical to us is just a minor detail. We know what's what, and we tend to feel it would be better for all concerned if everyone saw things the way we do.
We never seem to realize that big chunks of our understanding of reality reflect our own biases and perceptions, not the inherent nature of the world "out there." The perceptions we embrace with certitude are in fact usually best guesses about what is happening around us. And our certitude in these perceptions leaves us open to manipulation by others who present stories we find conveniently agreeable, even when those stories are lies. That certitude can also blind us to warning signs of coming disaster.
Ron Suskind once related a story about an anonymous aide who spoke about the Bush Administration creating its own reality:
The aide said that guys like me were ''in what we call the reality-based community,'' which he defined as people who ''believe that solutions emerge from your judicious study of discernible reality.'' I nodded and murmured something about enlightenment principles and empiricism. He cut me off. ''That's not the way the world really works anymore,'' he continued. ''We're an empire now, and when we act, we create our own reality. And while you're studying that reality -- judiciously, as you will -- we'll act again, creating other new realities, which you can study too, and that's how things will sort out. We're history's actors . . . and you, all of you, will be left to just study what we do.''Many of us with a liberal point of view may tend to view this Bush/Cheney perspective from a lofty perch in the “reality-based community” and conclude that these people are either sinister or crazy. However we need to recognize there’s an element of truth in that aide’s statement. And then we need to decide how to deal with it.
On the most simple level, the aide was right. The Bush administration has created realities - in the Middle East, in New Orleans, on Wall Street and Main Street - that we’re now trying to figure out how to deal with. The key proviso that they either didn’t acknowledge or didn’t recognize was that those created realities often turned out to be quite different from what they themselves expected.
But beyond that is a much bigger question: what is reality today? In his book “Reality Isn’t What It Used To Be,” political scientist Walter Truett Anderson argues that in today’s postmodern world we are inevitably dealing with socially constructed realities. He notes the relevance of this in understanding modern politics:
“...the real fount of political power, the source of all loyalty and all independence, is the reality-creating process by which we decide who we are and what we think is happening.”
Although this book was published in 1990, it appears to define a problem Democrats have had lately in presidential elections: while Republicans provide stories to voters about who we are and what is happening, Democrats all too often respond with position papers and program promises. The egghead label that frequently stuck with Gore and Kerry - and has threatened at times to stick to Obama - is probably rooted in this distinction. (Note that Bill Clinton, who was also an exceptionally intelligent politician, managed to generally avoid the egghead label by - among other things - connecting with voters and “feeling their pain.”)
As we’ve seen over the past eight years, Republican hubris in reality-making has frequently doomed their plans to failure. Anderson notes: “...our deliberate reality-creating, future-making, civilization-building projects always turn out to have unexpected consequences...” This is especially true when you fail to recognize that you’re not operating in a vacuum; that others are creating realities at the same time you are.
Being a member of the “reality-based community” can only be useful when we recognize this truth: in today’s world we are each involved in creating realities, and such realities always exist within a larger context of other people’s realities.
As for the many problems confronting us today and in the upcoming election, Anderson provides a perspective from 18 years ago:
“This is the issue that mass democracies are going to have to come to terms with: whether we can construct our large-scale public realities in forms that enable us to grow and change and engage the difficulties of life in adult ways, or whether we will inevitably gravitate toward simple fables of good guys and bad guys.”
Sunday, October 5, 2008
Complexity on Wall Street
Anyway, it's clear that there's going to be a lot of Monday morning quarterbacking of the whole financial system when things finally calm down. The following two articles - one in the New York Times and one in the Washington Post - offer intriguing views on some of the flaws in the current system, drawing on ideas from modern science.
In his Times article This Economy Does Not Compute, theoretical physicist Mark Buchanan takes issue with traditional economics' methodology. He begins by discussing the shortcomings of equilibrium theory, which "views markets as reflecting a balance of forces."
He argues:
Really understanding what’s going on means going beyond equilibrium thinking and getting some insight into the underlying ecology of beliefs and expectations, perceptions and misperceptions, that drive market swings.Buchanan says a number of people are now using computer models to get this insight. After discussing three different models and their initial findings, he notes:
Sadly, the academic economics profession remains reluctant to embrace this new computational approach (and stubbornly wedded to the traditional equilibrium picture). This seems decidedly peculiar given that every other branch of science from physics to molecular biology has embraced computational modeling as an invaluable tool for gaining insight into complex systems of many interacting parts, where the links between causes and effect can be tortuously convoluted.He concludes:
If we’re really going to avoid crises, we’re going to need something more imaginative, starting with a more open-minded attitude to how science can help us understand how markets really work. Done properly, computer simulation represents a kind of “telescope for the mind,” multiplying human powers of analysis and insight just as a telescope does our powers of vision. With simulations, we can discover relationships that the unaided human mind, or even the human mind aided with the best mathematical analysis, would never grasp.
Better market models alone will not prevent crises, but they may give regulators better ways for assessing market dynamics, and more important, techniques for detecting early signs of trouble. Economic tradition, of all things, shouldn’t be allowed to inhibit economic progress.
In a similar vein, James G. Rickards takes issue with the prevailing wisdom on risk management in his Post article A Mountain, Overlooked; How Risk Models Failed Wall St. and Washington. He begins by describing the way risk has been evaluated by financial institutions up to now, using complex mathematical models:
Since the 1990s, risk management on Wall Street has been dominated by a model called "value at risk" (VaR). VaR attributes risk factors to every security and aggregates these factors across an entire portfolio, identifying those risks that cancel out. What's left is "net" risk that is then considered in light of historical patterns. The model predicts with 99 percent probability that institutions cannot lose more than a certain amount of money. Institutions compare this "worst case" with their actual capital and, if the amount of capital is greater, sleep soundly at night. Regulators, knowing that the institutions used these models, also slept soundly. As long as capital was greater than the value at risk, institutions were considered sound -- and there was no need for hands-on regulation.
However, he notes "Lurking behind the models...was a colossal conceptual error: the belief that risk is randomly distributed and that each event has no bearing on the next event in a sequence." This is basically the same idea as tossing a coin: no matter how many times heads comes up, the odds of it being heads or tails the next time is still 50-50. But are markets really like coin tosses? Rickards says:
Both natural and man-made systems are full of the kind of complexity in which minute changes at the start result in divergent and unpredictable outcomes. These systems are sometimes referred to as "chaotic," but that's a misnomer; chaos theory permits an understanding of dynamic processes. Chaotic systems can be steered toward more regular behavior by affecting a small number of variables. But beyond chaos lies complexity that truly is unpredictable and cannot be modeled with even the most powerful computers. Capital markets are an example of such complex dynamic systems.
Think of a mountainside full of snow. A snowflake falls, an avalanche begins and a village is buried. What caused the catastrophe? The value-at-risk crowd focuses on each snowflake and resulting cause and effect. The complexity theorist studies the mountain. The arrangement of snow is a good example of a highly complex set of interdependent relationships; so complex it is impossible to model. If one snowflake did not set off the avalanche, the next one could, or the one after that. But it's not about the snowflakes; it's about the instability of the system. This is why ski patrols throw dynamite down the slopes each day before skiers arrive. They are "regulating" the system so that it does not become unstable.
Rickards concludes:
Financial systems overall have emergent properties that are not conspicuous in their individual components and that traditional risk management does not account for. When it comes to the markets, the aggregate risk is far greater than the sum of the individual risks; this is something that Long-Term Capital Management did not understand in the 1990s and that Wall Street seems not to comprehend now. As long as Wall Street and regulators keep using the wrong paradigm, there's no hope they will appreciate just how bad things can become. And the new paradigm of risk must be understood if we are to avoid lurching from one bank failure to the next.
I, for one, vote a Big No on all this lurching. Hopefully, Buchanan and Rickards can get their messages through to the Powers That Be.
Friday, October 3, 2008
What's Going On?
It's hard to look at what's happening in the world today without wondering what the heck is going on.